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Abstract—Traffic analysis is a type of attack on secure 
communications systems, in which the adversary extracts 
useful patterns and information from the observed traffic. This 
paper improves and extends an efficient traffic analysis attack, 
called “statistical disclosure attack.” Moreover, we propose a 
solution to defend against the improved (and, a fortiori, the 
original) statistical disclosure attack. Our solution delays the 
attacker considerably, meaning that he should gather 
significantly more observations to be able to deduce 
meaningful information from the traffic. 
Keywords-Privacy; Anonymity; Mix-Net; SDA. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Anonymity is a mechanism for providing privacy in 
communications systems. Research on anonymous 
communications systems began by the seminal work of 
Chaum in 1981. He introduced the concept of mixes as a way 
of providing unlinkability, i.e. removing any association 
between entities in the system [1]. Since then, many 
anonymity protocols were proposed, each of which has 
different characteristics for various requirements. Besides 
designing these protocols, research is conducted on 
vulnerability analysis of anonymous communications 
systems. As a result, numerous “privacy-violating” attacks 
were discovered. The ultimate goal of such attacks is to 
eliminate or reduce the amount of anonymity. While some 
attacks exploit the vulnerabilities in the protocol design or 
implementation—such as timing attacks, tagging attacks, 
blending attacks, etc. [2], there are other kinds of attacks 
which assume that the protocol design or implementation has 
no vulnerabilities. Here, the attacker merely observes 
protocol execution, while being oblivious to the internal 
mechanism of anonymity protocol. If the attack is successful, 
the attacker will be able to find associations between users; 
that is, he can tell which users where communicating during 
the attack. These types of attacks are named Intersection 
Attacks. Statistical Disclosure Attack (SDA) is one of the 
most efficient intersection attacks applicable on mix-nets [8]. 
In this paper, we improve SDA, so as it requires fewer 
observations to reduce anonymity. For any “target” user 
Alice, we identify users whose behavior affects Alice’s 
anonymity, and name them cloak users. To uncover Alice 
partners (those associated with her), it is sufficient to merely 
estimate the behavior of cloak users, rather than all users.  
In addition, we extend SDA to cover a non-threshold mix 
named “SG-Mix”. To this end, we use the queueing theory to 
model message delays in SG-Mix.  
We finally suggest a solution to counter both the 
improved and the original SDA. Our solution delays the 
adversary considerably, since he needs to gather a great deal 
of observations before he can effectively mount the attack. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section  II, we present a brief description of mix-nets and 
traffic analysis attacks, such as disclosure and statistical 
disclosure attacks. In Section  III, we present our 
contributions: the improved SDA is demonstrated in  III.A; 
III.B includes our extension to the attack to cover a low-
latency protocol  III.B, and  III.C describes our proposed 
method to resist intersection attacks. We show the 
effectiveness of the improvement and resistance methods by 
simulations in Section  IV. Finally, Section  V concludes the 
paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Chaum [3] introduced anonymous communications by 
defining the concept of “mix.” A mix is a special router that 
provides anonymity by changing the bit pattern of messages, 
and by reordering them, so that no arriving message can be 
linked to a leaving one. In the Chaum’s mix, the message bit 
pattern is changed by cryptographic functions, that is, every 
message is decrypted and will then be sent to its receiver in 
the alphabetic order. If the mix gets compromised, no 
anonymity is provided. Hence, instead of using just one mix, 
usually a chain of mixes is used. The anonymity of messages 
is guaranteed as long as at least one mix in the chain is 
honest. 
The first model of the mix, introduced in [3], is called 
“Threshold Mix,” as it waits until a constant number of 
messages arrives, and then decrypts and flushes them out. 
Other types of mixes, based on their flushing methods 
include timed mixes, pool mixes, and Stop-and-Go (SG) 
mixes. A good survey of these flushing algorithms is 
available in [2]. Here, we review SG-Mix in more detail, as 
we are going to extend an attack on this protocol.  
Kesdogan et al.[4] proposed a mix design which does not 
use batch processing. In this design, the sender derives—
from an exponential distribution with parameter μ—a ti delay 
for the ith mix in the chain, puts this delay in the encrypted 
message, and sends the message to the SG-Mix. The ith SG-
Mix decrypts the message and obtains ti. The message will 
be flushed after a ti delay. As there is no batch processing, 
SG-Mix is considered a low-latency mix, and can be used in 
applications with sensitive timing constraints like web 
surfing. In [5], Danezis showed that SG-Mix provides the 
optimal mixing strategy among low-latency anonymity 
protocols. 
Thus far, we have considered mixes as a strategy to 
provide anonymity in communications networks. Next, we 
will examine attacks against such anonymous systems. 
The ultimate goal of these attacks is to reduce the 
anonymity of users. Good surveys of such attacks are 
available in [2][6]. Some attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the 
protocol design or implementation. The attacker can 
compromise protocol nodes, trace a message, delay a 
message or manipulate it to distinguish its relevance to other 
messages. In addition, the attacker can flood protocol nodes 
to learn a specific message destination. Moreover, it can 
replay captured messages from previous executions of the 
protocol. On the other hand, some other attacks are oblivious 
to the internal operation of anonymity protocol, and assume 
there is no vulnerability in the protocol design and 
implementation. Here, the attacker just observes the protocol 
execution, and concludes links between users from these 
observations. The latter type of attack is termed “intersection 
attacks.” 
Agrawal and Kesdogan [7] presented an intersection 
attack named “Disclosure Attack.” In this attack, the 
anonymity system is abstracted as follows: a subset of 
senders sends their messages to a subset of receivers in 
several rounds. The passive attacker is able to observe 
messages entering to and leaving from the anonymity 
system. In each round, two sets of users can be identified: the 
set of users who send messages (sender-set), and the set of 
users who receive messages (receiver-set). The attack’s aim 
is to reveal partners of a “target” user, named Alice. It is 
assumed that Alice has m partners. Moreover, she sends at 
most one message in each round. If Alice is going to send in 
a round, she selects her receiver uniformly from her m 
partners. The batch size is b; that is, in each round, b users 
participate. There are a total of N recipients, and each sender 
(except Alice) selects its recipient uniformly from all the 
recipients. 
Unfortunately, the attacker in the above model has to do 
an NP-complete computation to identify Alice partners. As a 
solution, Danezis [8] proposed a statistical version of the 
disclosure attack. Statistical Disclosure Attack (SDA) is 
more efficient than the naïve disclosure attack, as it does not 
have to solve an NP-complete problem. However, SDA 
cannot identify Alice’s partners for certain. There is always 
some uncertainty in the solution obtained by SDA. 
In SDA, users’ behavior is modeled by vectors 𝑢𝑢�⃗ , ?⃗?𝑣, and 
?⃗?𝑜𝑖𝑖  of N elements. In these vectors, the ith element 
corresponds to the probability of receiving some specified 
message by ith user. Vector ?⃗?𝑣 models Alice’s behavior. The 
ultimate goal of the adversary is to find this vector. In ?⃗?𝑣, all 
m partners of Alice have probability 1
𝑚𝑚
  and the remaining N-
m elements are zero. Vector 𝑢𝑢�⃗  is used to model the behavior 
of users other than Alice. Initially, all the N elements of this 
vector are 1
𝑁𝑁
. The attacker observes protocol execution and 
derives observation vectors ?⃗?𝑜𝑖𝑖  from the receiver-set of round 
i. The jth element of ?⃗?𝑜𝑖𝑖  denotes the probability that the jth 
user be Alice partner in round i. So, in each round that Alice 
participates, every user in the receiver-set has probability 1
𝑏𝑏
 of receiving the message from Alice. Based on the law of 
large numbers, the attacker can take arithmetic mean of a 
large number of these observation vectors: 
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Accordingly, it can derive ?⃗?𝑣: 
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In [9], authors extended this attack to Pool Mixes, which 
do not flush all messages, and always retain a constant 
number of messages in the pool. In [10], authors tried to use 
all observations, and find a better estimation for other users’ 
behavior. They used arithmetic mean of observations in 
which Alice did not participate, as an alternative to vector 𝑢𝑢�⃗ .  
Several methods have also been proposed to counter (i.e. 
delay) intersection attacks, most of which consider sending 
dummy messages by users or mixes [10][11][12]. 
III. CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this section, we express our improvement in SDA’s 
effectiveness, the way to extend it to SG-mixes, and also our 
proposal to resist against. 
The classical SDA has many limiting assumptions; it 
assumes users (except Alice) can select their partners from 
all recipients with equal probability. In addition, Alice 
selects the receiver uniformly from her m partners. The 
mixing process is assumed to be batch processing.  
It is more realistic to assume that every user in the 
anonymity system is associated with a set of partners and the 
user does not necessarily select the receiver uniformly from 
this set. Also incorporation of batch processing is a 
significant merit.   
The bottleneck in SDA is the number of observations 
required to identify Alice partners. So, improving the attack 
means decreasing the number of such required observations. 
To do so, we use an estimation to model other users’ 
behavior. SDA was proposed to be applied on anonymity 
protocols such as mix-nets which use batch processing. The 
attack was extended [9] to a probabilistic variation of mixes 
named Pool Mix. We extend it to SG-Mix, which is a low-
latency anonymity protocol, whilst it delivers the most 
degree of anonymity among low-latency protocols [5].  Our 
proposed new method of resisting SDA neither requires the 
mixing strategy to change, nor requires all users to send 
dummy messages. 
A. Improving SDA 
We propose a more efficient way to estimate the behavior 
of the other users. To this end, we identify effective users on 
Alice’s anonymity, and then estimate their behavior. In the 
classical SDA, Alice selects her recipients from the set M, 
with equal probability, and other users select their recipients 
uniformly from all N recipients. The attacker uses the vector 
𝑢𝑢�⃗  to model the behavior of other users. Therefore, the 
vector ?⃗?𝑣, which is the goal of the attack, is an N-ary vector 
having m components of 1
𝑚𝑚
 and N-m zero components. None 
of these assumptions are realistic; every user can have her 
own set of recipients, and is not compelled to select her 
recipient uniformly from the set.  
If we consider a specific set of partners for every user, we 
cannot use the vector 𝑢𝑢�⃗  anymore; using 𝑢𝑢�⃗  implies that users 
select their recipients uniformly from all the other users. 
Therefore, estimating the behavior of the other users is 
necessary. In [10], a solution is proposed to achieve such 
estimation. They used the median of observations from 
rounds in which Alice has not participated, to model the 
behavior of other users. The estimation includes all users in 
the anonymity system; whilst for an effective attack, we 
should consider only users who are effective in hiding the 
Alice’s communication. Therefore, the method in [10] 
suffers from hiding of the behavior of users who affect 
Alice’s anonymity. On the other hand, when the number of 
observations increases, this estimation becomes very similar 
to 𝑢𝑢�⃗ , and so is not an appropriate model. 
In the rest of this paper, we use the notations in Table 1 
to illustrate our method. 
TABLE I.  SYMBOLS USED IN THIS PAPER 
Symbol Descriptions 
𝐴𝐴 Set of all senders 
𝐴𝐴′𝑖𝑖  Sender-set in round i 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  Set of rounds in which user i participated 
𝐵𝐵 Set of all receivers 
𝐵𝐵′𝑖𝑖  Receiver-set in round i 
𝑣𝑣 Alice’s send vector 
𝑢𝑢�⃗  Uniform send vector 
?⃗?𝑜𝑖𝑖  Observations vector in round i 
𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  jth element of ith observation vector 
𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟  Number of Alice’s messages in round r 
 
To be more precise, the following definitions are 
considered. 
Definition 1: S is a Boolean function demonstrating if the 
user e has participated in round i: 
{1 if user  has participated in round 0 otherwise.S( , ) e ie i =  
Using S, the sender-set of the ith round can be defined as 
follows. 
Definition 2: iA′  is the set of users participating in round 
i: 
{ | S( , ) 1}iA e A e i′ = ∈ =  
Supposing the protocol to be executed for t rounds, we 
can define the set 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  as follows. 
Definition 3: 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is the set of all rounds in which user ei 
has participated: 
{ |1 }i i jG j j t e A′= ≤ ≤ ∧ ∈  
From Definition 3, we can divide rounds into two 
categories: those including Alice ( 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ) and those 
excluding Alice ( ?̅?𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ). We need an estimate on the 
behavior of users who affect Alice’s anonymity. 
When Alice participates in a round, her messages become 
anonymous among the other messages sent in that round. So, 
all users participating in the round affect   the anonymity of 
Alice’s messages. From the attacker point of view, such 
effective users must be identified and be considered in 
disclosing Alice partners.  
In each round, attacker notices a set of senders who send 
their messages to a set of receivers. So, the sender-set and 
the receiver-set can be constructed for the round. If Alice 
participates in the ith round, every user in the ith sender-set 
affects the Alice’s anonymity. To identify such users, we 
define cloak users as follow: 
Definition4: for the user ei, the set of cloak users include 
users who have participated in at least one round with ei. 
{ | { }}
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The set of Alice’s cloak users is CloakAlice. We need an 
estimate on the behavior of users in CloakAlice. To this end, 
we extract such rounds from ?̅?𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  in which at least one user 
from CloakAlice has participated. Such rounds are collected in 
the set AliceP . 
Definition5: The set Pi includes those rounds of ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖  in 
which the cloak user of ei has participated: 
{ | }i i i jP j G Cloak A′= ∈ ≠ ∅  
The average of the observations from rounds in PAlice is 
used as the estimation for the behavior of cloak users 
(𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟����������������������⃗ ) calculated as: 
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Using this estimation and the law of large numbers, the 
vector ?⃗?𝑣 can be calculated as: 
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Where 𝑡𝑡′ = |𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 | and 𝑎𝑎� is the average of Alice’s share 
in the number of messages sent in each round: 
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The improved SDA can be summarized as the following 
steps: 
1. Observe all rounds of the protocol execution 
2. Calculate observation vectors for each round 
3. Divide rounds into two sets: 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and ?̅?𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴  
4. Identify cloak users 
5. Construct PAlice 
6. Calculate 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟����������������������⃗  
7. Calculate ?⃗?𝑣 
To this end, the attacker uses all available observations to 
identify Alice partners. Using this improved attack, a better 
estimation of behavior of effective users on Alice’s 
anonymity will be achieved; and no constraint will be 
imposed on any other users’ behavior. In Section  IV, we 
explain how this method reduces the number of required 
observations. 
B. Extending SDA 
SDA has been applied to anonymity systems with batch 
processing. In [9], authors extended SDA to cover Pool 
Mixes, which is a probabilistic mix. In this section, we 
extend the attack to cover a low-latency anonymity protocol 
named SG-Mix [4]. We chose SG-Mix due to its provision of 
the most optimal mixing strategies among low-latency 
protocols [5]. 
The model of anonymity system in SDA is a simplified 
form of mix-net, where execution of protocol is divided into 
rounds. In each round, a subset of users sends their messages 
to another subset of users. So, in protocols such as mix-nets, 
which collect input messages into batches and processes 
them after a threshold, each batch is equivalent to a round. 
However, batch processing imposes a great delay to the 
delivered messages. As most of online applications have 
timing constraints, low latency anonymity protocols would 
be of more interest.  
For simplicity, we extend the attack to one SG-Mix, and 
assume whenever Alice sends a message to SG-Mix, she will 
not send another one until the first one has left the SG-Mix 
(ar=1). 
To apply SDA to any anonymity protocol, the protocol 
must be mapped onto the attack model. To extend the attack 
to SG-Mix, it is necessary to identify sender-sets and 
receiver-sets of each round. To do so, we model the delay of 
a SG-Mix. 
1) SG-Mix Delay Model 
As mentioned in Section  II, the distribution of message 
delays is exponential with parameter μ. Assuming the 
message arrival distribution is Poisson with parameter λ, 
then the SG-Mix can be modeled as an M/M/∞ queue. The 
maximum delay of a message (we refer to it as τ) can be 
found using such a modeling. 
 As distribution of delay in SG-Mix is exponential with 
parameter μ, the mean and standard deviation of the delay is 1
𝜇𝜇
. Using one-sided Chebychev’s inequality, the maximum 
delay of a message in SG-Mix can be estimated. The 
inequality says:  
 2
1Pr( E( ) ) .
1
X X k
k
σ+ ≥ ≤
+
 (6) 
where X is a random variable with mean E(X) and standard 
deviation σ. The parameter k determines the amount of 
confidence. For example, for k=3, at least 90% values of X 
are less than or equal to E(X)+kσ. In such a case, with the 
confidence of  1 − 11+𝐶𝐶2 , it can be said that a message will 
leave SG-Mix at most  𝐶𝐶+1
𝜇𝜇
 after its entrance. In the other 
words:  
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To find τ, μ is required; which is the parameter of delay 
distribution. In an M/M/∞ queue, the number of messages in 
the queue, upon entrance of a new message is 𝜆𝜆
𝜇𝜇
. To provide 
anonymity for messages, it is necessary that at least one 
message be in the queue upon its entrance; i.e. 𝜆𝜆
𝜇𝜇
≥ 1 . 
Otherwise, SG-Mix behaves as a first-in first-out queue and 
no anonymity will be provided [5], i.e: 
 .µ λ≤  (8) 
The parameter λ can be anticipated from the rate of 
incoming messages. So, λ is used as an upper bound for μ in 
our relations. To estimate λ, incoming messages to SG-Mix 
can be observed for a period of time T. Considering the 
number of entered messages in this period as x, 𝜆𝜆 = 𝑥𝑥
𝑇𝑇
; 
having λ as the message entrance rate in the unit of time. 
2) Construct Sets 
Using the maximum delay from (7), we can build sender-
set and receiver-set. The set of all messages to which Alice’s 
message blend forms receiver-set; and the set of all potential 
senders of messages in receiver-set, forms sender-set. The 
following theorems illustrate formation of these two sets. 
Theorem 1: If Alice’s message enters SG-Mix at time t, 
the receiver-set is comprised of all users receiving at least 
one message in the interval  𝑊𝑊1 =  [t, t + τ]. 
Proof: As the maximum delay of a message in SG-Mix is  τ, Alice’s message will leave the Mix at most at timet + τ. 
So, every user receiving at least one message from Mix in [t, t + τ] interval, can be Alice’s partner, thus must be in the 
receiver-set. □ 
Theorem 2: If Alice’s message enters SG-Mix at time t, 
all users who send a message to the Mix in the interval 
𝑊𝑊2 =  [t − τ, t + τ] will be in the sender-set. 
Proof: From Theorem 1, the receiver-set is formed. So 
we try to relate messages in the receiver-set to senders. As 
the maximum delay is τ, so the message leaving the Mix at 
time t, could have been sent at worst at t − τ (with maximum 
delay). The message which leaves Mix at time t + τ, could 
have been sent at t + τ  (with no delay). Thus, every user 
who sends a message to Mix in the interval [t − τ, t + τ] 
interval, is a member of the sender-set. □ 
To perform the attack, observation vectors ( ?⃗?𝑜 ) are 
necessary. As mentioned earlier in Section  II, these vectors 
can be calculated from the receiver-sets. Cloak users are 
identified from sender-sets. The only remaining parameter 
prior to performing the attack is the batch size (b). In SDA, 
this parameter indicates the number of sent messages in each 
batch; but in SG-Mix there is no batch processing. The batch 
size determines number of messages which are blended 
together to provide anonymity. The size of the sender-sets 
can be used as parameter b. The number of users 
participating in each sender-set differs from round to round; 
and so we use the mean size of sender-sets as parameter b. 
The extension of SDA to SG-Mixes can be summed up 
through the following steps: 
1. Observe the protocol execution 
2. Estimate the parameter  λ 
3. Calculate the intervals 𝑊𝑊1 and 𝑊𝑊2 
4. Determine the sender-set and the receiver-set for 
Alice’s messages 
5. Obtain parameter b from the size of sender-sets 
6. Calculate the vectors ?⃗?𝑜 from receiver-sets 
7. Identify cloak users from sender-sets 
8. Determine the sender and receiver-sets for cloak users 
9. Calculate ?⃗?𝑜 vectors for cloak users 
10. Calculate 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟��������������������⃗  
11. Calculate ?⃗?𝑣 
C. Resisting Against the Improved SDA 
There is no way to fully defend a protocol against 
intersection attacks such as SDA; whereas some ideas have 
been proposed to delay the attack; that is, increasing the 
number of required observations to succeed.  Almost all of 
such methods include sending dummy messages by mix or by 
users in each round. However, the methods suffer from 
imposing of a great communication load due to sending of 
dummy messages. In some methods, users must participate 
in each round despite their willingness. The mix strategy 
must also be changed (to send/drop dummy messages) and 
thus the mixing process takes longer. 
As mentioned in Section  IV, increasing the value of two 
parameters b and m leads to an increase in the number of 
required observations. Sending dummy messages by users or 
mix tends to benefit from the role of parameter b. This 
parameter determines the number of messages blending 
together in each round. So, sending dummy messages is an 
attempt to hide Alice’s message among more cloak users. 
Our Sybil defense benefits from the role of parameter m in 
the attack difficulty. The parameter determines the diversity 
of Alice’s selection. More divert selections leaks less 
information about each recipient’s identity. 
In our method, Alice participates with n pseudonyms in 
the anonymity protocol. These pseudonyms are not linkable 
to Alice’s identity in any way. Every pseudonym has its own 
set of recipients (different m). In each round where Alice 
intends to send a message, she sends a message by any of her 
pseudonym as well. For example, if Alice participates in the 
protocol as her own identity as well as another identity 
like 𝐴𝐴′ ; whenever Alice wants to send a message, she selects 
her recipient from a set of m members, and 𝐴𝐴′ selects her 
recipient from a set of 𝑚𝑚′ members. In each round where 
Alice is included in the sender-set,  𝐴𝐴′  is also included; 
accordingly the attacker cannot distinguish partners of  𝐴𝐴′  
from partners of Alice. This can be considered as a scenario 
in which a user selects her partners from a set of size 𝑚𝑚 +
𝑚𝑚′ .  
More pseudonymous identities lead to more complexity 
for the attacker. We refer to our method as Sybil defense, 
because of using multiple and unlinkable identities.  
In Section  IV, we will describe the implementation and 
evaluation of our defense method against the standard and 
improved SDA. As advantages of our defense method, there 
is no need to overwhelm the network by dummy messages 
and also, each user can use such protection by her willing 
and based on the amount of required anonymity. 
IV. SIMULATION 
Our simulator is inspired from [10]. Similar simulators 
was also used in [12] and [13].  
A. Simulation Plan 
For simulation, we generated observations and applied 
the standard and improved SDA to a unique system 
configuration under assumptions of original SDA. By 
configuration, we mean specific values of system parameters 
N, b, and m. To create observations for a configuration, we 
determined the set of partners for all users. To simulate each 
round, a sample of size b was obtained with replacement 
from the set of all users. This sample denotes the set of 
senders in that round. The sampling was performed with 
replacement to allow each user to send more than one 
message per round. For each sender, the corresponding 
receiver(s) was (were) determined based on the sender’s 
partner set. 
To show effectiveness of our improvement, we applied 
both attacks to several configurations and compared the 
number of required observation for each successful attack. 
We continued an attack until it revealed at least 80% of 
Alice’s partners or passed over the limit of 5000 
observations. We repeated the experiment 100 times per 
configuration before reporting the attack results. The pseudo 
code of the simulation is shown in Figure 1. 
B. Results 
We run the simulation with default values of N=20000, 
b=50, and m=20. In each comparison, we changed one 
parameter, whereas the other two were kept unchanged. 
Figure 2 depicts the effect of changing N (number of 
system users) on the attacks. As N increases, the number of 
required observations decreases for both the attacks; with the 
need of fewer observations in the case of the improved SDA. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the effect of batch size on the 
attacks. As parameter b increases, the number of required 
observations increases. As increasing the batch size results in 
increasing the number of messages which blend with Alice’s 
ones, the problem become more difficult. As batch size 
increases, the improved attack needs less observation than 
the standard SDA. 
Figure 4 shows the role of parameter m on the attacks. 
This parameter defines the number of Alice partners. By 
increasing m, Alice sends messages to more different users, 
so Alice’s behavior becomes more diverse. For SDA, the 
number of observations increases extraordinarily when 
m≥20, but for the improved SDA, the number of 
observations increases gently. In the other words, when 
m≥20, SDA becomes inapplicable; while the improved SDA 
is still applicable. Accordingly, the main advantage of our 
improvement is where Alice increases her behavior diversity. 
#Generate Observations  
fori = 1 .. t 
senderSet← a sample of size b from N 
for each k in senderSet do 
 Choose a receiver from k’s send vector 
and insert it into receiverSet 
end 
end 
 
# Statistical Disclosure Attack 
rounds← rounds that Alice participated in it 
t ← |rounds| 
for each r in rounds 
for each k in receiverSet(r) 
 O(k) += 1/b 
end 
end 
 
# Improved SDA 
Calculate O vectors for all rounds, as before. 
for each r in rounds 
if Alice is a sender in r 
 then 𝐺𝐺 ← 𝐺𝐺⋃𝑟𝑟 
 else ?̅?𝐺 ← ?̅?𝐺⋃𝑟𝑟 
end 
for each r in ?̅?𝐺 
 add all senders of r except Alice to CloakAlice 
end 
for each r in ?̅?𝐺 
 if 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ∩ 𝐴𝐴′ 𝑟𝑟 ≠ ∅ 
  then 𝑃𝑃 ← 𝑃𝑃 ∪ 𝑟𝑟 
end 
 
𝑂𝑂� ←�
𝑂𝑂(𝐶𝐶)
𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶
 
?⃗?𝑣 ← 𝑏𝑏.𝑂𝑂� − (𝑏𝑏 − 1).𝑢𝑢�⃗  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟��������������������⃗ ←
1|𝑃𝑃|�(𝑂𝑂(𝐶𝐶)|𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝑃𝑃)
𝐶𝐶
 
?⃗?𝑣 ←
𝑏𝑏|𝐺𝐺|�(𝑂𝑂(𝐶𝐶)|𝐶𝐶 ∈ 𝐺𝐺) − (𝑏𝑏 − 1)𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟��������������������⃗
𝐶𝐶
 
Figure 1.  Simulation pseudo code 
To show the effect of the Sybil Defense introduced in 
Section  III.C, we changed the way of generating of 
observations. In all the related simulations, we used just one 
pseudonym (𝐴𝐴′)for Alice. To determine the senders of a 
round, if Alice is included as a sender, we inserted the user 
𝐴𝐴′ to the set of senders and for every user in the sender-set, 
the corresponding recipient is selected from the partner set. 
The simulations confirmed that no attack could finish in 
none of the configurations before reaching the observation 
limit. This means that the attacker is unable to identify at 
least 80% of Alice’s partners, whereas prior to employing the 
Sybil defense, both attacks were finished before reaching the 
5000 observation limit. So the Sybil defense can effectively 
delay the attacker’s success. 
While we examined our resistance method on SDA, it is 
effective on all intersection attacks, such as the Hitting Set 
Attack [14], as it can unsettle the uniqueness of hitting set. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we improved the Statistical Disclosure 
Attack (SDA) in a way that it needs fewer observations to 
succeed, and extended it to cover a non-threshold mix 
protocol called SG-Mix. Finally, we proposed a resistance 
method to delay attackers’ success. 
We relaxed some limiting and unrealistic assumptions of 
SDA. In the relaxed assumptions, other users can have their 
specific sending vectors, and are not compelled to select their 
receivers uniformly from all users. Moreover, Alice can 
select her receivers non-uniformly from her m partners.  
To model the message delay in SG-Mix we employed the 
queueing theory. An SG-Mix can be modeled as an M/M/∞ 
queue with Poisson arrivals and exponential delays. From 
there the maximum delay of a message was calculated and 
then observation vectors were constructed. 
Our resistance method resulted in a great effect on the 
attack. In the normal scenario, the attacker was able to 
identify at least 80% of Alice’s partners, while by employing 
just one pseudonymous identity by Alice, the attack became 
inapplicable. We believe that our method is effective on all 
intersection attacks such as the hitting set attack (by 
unsettling the uniqueness of hitting set), but this must be 
evaluated in more details as future work. 
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Figure 2.  Effect of parameter N (number of users) on attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Effect of parameter b (batch size) on attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Effect of parameter m (number of partners) on attacks 
 
 
  
